Despite all the attention now paid to online delivery of movie and video programming, after 25 years, consumers globally still show an overwhelming preference for renting shows using some form of physical media.
Video-on-demand services, which have been available for 25 years, continue to lag other methods of delivery, DVD rentals and purchases being the dominant method.
The other significant issue is that demand for all forms of on-demand video seems to have flattened out, globally. That suggests displacement, not growth, is the strategic imperative. For VOD providers, the issue remains: can VOD grab more share of the market than developing online delivery methods?
Tampilkan postingan dengan label video on demand. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label video on demand. Tampilkan semua postingan
Senin, 01 November 2010
Senin, 25 Oktober 2010
Internet TV and The Death of Cable TV
Lots of people believe video distribution is going to change, and the only question is how long it will take. Some think the important thing is the number of alternative venues now available, or which will likely be made available, to view professionally-produced content users now associate with "cable TV."
All you need to know is what the content owners want to do, and when.
The networks aren’t blocking Google TV access to content because Google is uniquely disruptive. They are blocking Google TV access to network content because "web TV" economics likely would be incredibly disruptive to the current business.
Content owners want preservation of existing revenue streams--at least the magnitude of those streams--as "over the top" delivery modes develop. One might question whether that is possible, but there is no question the networks will attempt to maintain the existing business practices to the greatest extent possible.
Cable, for its part, claims the lowest-possible distribution cost, from an end-use standpoint. The objection many users will have is that the cost to deliver programming that is not wanted is not the important metric. What matters is the cost to view only the content any single viewer wants to watch.
The key is what content owners are willing to accept.
The key is what content owners are willing to accept.
Label:
online video,
over the top,
video on demand
Kamis, 03 Desember 2009
What Does Comcast-NBC Universal Merger Mean?
The Comcast merger with NBC Universal will be viewed in many ways: a way for Comcast to move upstream in the content business or a chance to grow the "digital" or "new media" side of the merged company's operations.
The merger also is about protecting the value of the exsiting video distribution ecosystem from destabilizing change. "TV Everywhere," the cable industry approach to enabling use of paid-for video content on any screen, is a similar initiative.
The move also suggests a view on the part of Comcast management that the cable TV distribution business has limited upside left. Revenue growth for virtually all of the cable companies now is coming from voice and high-speed data services, with the emphasis now shifting to business customers, as even the consumer elements of that business are seeing slower growth.
One might question the ultimate value of the move, either as a way of growing revenues near term, or as a strategic bridge to the future. The near term value is clearer, though.
Essentially, the attempt is to provide low-cost or no-incremental cost, convenient access to large quantities of popular professional video while baking in an indirect business model. If you think about the way metro Wi-Fi hotspot access now is positioned by cable and telco service providers, you'll get the idea. The direct revenue actually is produced by purchases of fixed broadband access service.
Then Wi-Fi access is added as a "no incremental charge" enhancement. In the same way, some mobile broadband plans might be pitched as fees for "mobile Internet" access, but then also allow no-incremental cost email access.
In other words, Comcast wants to hang onto the proven business it has--all it "cable TV"--while merchandising "new media" access to that content on smartphones and PCs, for example.
Perhaps Comcast and others would prefer to keep the old business while growing a new one with a direct revenue model, but that seems problematic for most content distributors and owners.
Some studies suggest users will pay some amount for mobile or on-demand video and TV. The issue is how much such users would be willing to pay. Consider a scenario where a typical user pays $10 a month for mobile and other on-demand access, and where the typical household consists of three people, for a total revenue of $30 a month.
Consider that for most households, multi-channel video now costs between $70 and $100 a month, and that is a flat charge for all users in the home. That works out fine if there is no cannibalization of the fixed connection.
But it won't take much substitution to wipe out all the gains from the incremental on-demand revenue. Unless, of course, the different approach is taken: keep your regular subscription and we'll give you the additional on-demand capbility for no incremental cost or low cost.
The merger also is about protecting the value of the exsiting video distribution ecosystem from destabilizing change. "TV Everywhere," the cable industry approach to enabling use of paid-for video content on any screen, is a similar initiative.
The move also suggests a view on the part of Comcast management that the cable TV distribution business has limited upside left. Revenue growth for virtually all of the cable companies now is coming from voice and high-speed data services, with the emphasis now shifting to business customers, as even the consumer elements of that business are seeing slower growth.
One might question the ultimate value of the move, either as a way of growing revenues near term, or as a strategic bridge to the future. The near term value is clearer, though.
Essentially, the attempt is to provide low-cost or no-incremental cost, convenient access to large quantities of popular professional video while baking in an indirect business model. If you think about the way metro Wi-Fi hotspot access now is positioned by cable and telco service providers, you'll get the idea. The direct revenue actually is produced by purchases of fixed broadband access service.
Then Wi-Fi access is added as a "no incremental charge" enhancement. In the same way, some mobile broadband plans might be pitched as fees for "mobile Internet" access, but then also allow no-incremental cost email access.
In other words, Comcast wants to hang onto the proven business it has--all it "cable TV"--while merchandising "new media" access to that content on smartphones and PCs, for example.
Perhaps Comcast and others would prefer to keep the old business while growing a new one with a direct revenue model, but that seems problematic for most content distributors and owners.
Some studies suggest users will pay some amount for mobile or on-demand video and TV. The issue is how much such users would be willing to pay. Consider a scenario where a typical user pays $10 a month for mobile and other on-demand access, and where the typical household consists of three people, for a total revenue of $30 a month.
Consider that for most households, multi-channel video now costs between $70 and $100 a month, and that is a flat charge for all users in the home. That works out fine if there is no cannibalization of the fixed connection.
But it won't take much substitution to wipe out all the gains from the incremental on-demand revenue. Unless, of course, the different approach is taken: keep your regular subscription and we'll give you the additional on-demand capbility for no incremental cost or low cost.
Label:
comcast,
online video,
video on demand
Rabu, 27 Februari 2008
Why Netflix is Not "Toast"
On-demand video might affect the DVD rental business someday, but apparently not this year. Netflix just revised first quarter and full-year 2008 guidance. For the year, Netflix expects to have 8.9 million to 9.5 million subscribers, up from the prior forecast of 8.4 million to 8.9 million subs. It expects revenue of $1.345 billion to $1.385 billion, up from $1.3 billion to $1.35 billion. It expects unchanged GAAP net income of $75 million to $83 million. But GAAP earning per share will be higher. The new forecast calls for $1.18 to $1.30 per diluted share, up from $1.12 to $1.24 per diluted share.
On-demand viewing is convenient, to be sure. But there are countervailing values as well. On-demand purchases introduce an element of uncertainty into monthly budgeting of expenses. On-demand rentals can be cash transactions, with no later unexpected financial impact. It's an underestimated value for physical rentals rather than on-demand purchases.
Flat rate is important for many consumers. So is the "unlimited" number of titles one can buy on some Netflix plans. That adds more value. Think of how parents view texting charges. Why do so many people buy relatively large plans? Because they don't want overage charges.
On-demand viewing leads to "overage" charges. Flat-rate or "cash on demand" services eliminate that uncertainty.
On-demand viewing is convenient, to be sure. But there are countervailing values as well. On-demand purchases introduce an element of uncertainty into monthly budgeting of expenses. On-demand rentals can be cash transactions, with no later unexpected financial impact. It's an underestimated value for physical rentals rather than on-demand purchases.
Flat rate is important for many consumers. So is the "unlimited" number of titles one can buy on some Netflix plans. That adds more value. Think of how parents view texting charges. Why do so many people buy relatively large plans? Because they don't want overage charges.
On-demand viewing leads to "overage" charges. Flat-rate or "cash on demand" services eliminate that uncertainty.
Label:
Netflix,
online video,
video on demand
Langganan:
Postingan (Atom)